Since the UN's 2005 adoption of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) the five permanent members (P5) of the organisation's Security Council have been burdened with a special dual responsibility, entailing a special responsibility to maintain international peace and security, and a special responsibility to assist those imperilled by the mass atrocity crimes of their home state. The tensions which can arise within this dual responsibility is a largely underexplored aspect of the R2P literature. But consideration of it helps explain why, despite differing views over how best to balance individual and state rights, at times accentuated by clashing interests, the P5 have nevertheless found common R2P ground, most particularly in their largely concerted opposition to the idea of a 'responsibility not to veto' R2P-related resolutions within the Council.
Introduction
Power and state sovereignty, like state sovereignty and forcible intervention to protect human rights, are often uneasy bedfellows. In debates centred on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) -and before them over the rightfulness of humanitarian interventionattention has tended to focus on the problematic nature of the latter coupling, with its component elements 'often assumed', as the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty's (ICISS) research team observed, 'to be irreconcilable and contradictory'. observed in 2000, 'there is little consistency in the practice of intervention ... except that weak states are far more likely to be subjected to it than strong ones'. 3 The different emphases evident in these observations have tended to manifest themselves in two divergent understandings of intervention for humanitarian purposes. In one it is strategic factors that are offered as the key variables determining the policies of states, with responses to interventionary acts depicted as being determined by their impact on the balance of power and thus essentially symptomatic of geostrategic reasoning. State practice during the Cold War offers fertile ground for such narratives, as ostensibly humanitarian issues were viewed in accordance with their impact on wider Cold War politics. 4 In the other, more intervention/R2P-centric account, it is normative contestation over the appropriate weighting of state and human rights, often intertwined with concerns over ulterior self-interested rationales, which provides the focus for analysis. Nowhere is this latter portrayal more evident than in analyses of post-Cold War, and particularly R2P-related state behaviour in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) which reveals one of the major Great Power fault lines in international politics. Here the Council's members, and in particular its five permanent, veto-bearing members (the P5), have engaged in often fraught diplomatic exchanges, with the United States, the United Kingdom and France (the P3), more inclined toward intervention, and the other two, Russia and China (the P2), invariably -if not quite always -more cautious or overtly opposed.
This article offers an alternative narrative which highlights the extent to which the P5 are today largely united over key R2P-related issues, specifically in a common commitment 55-136. to the view that coercive action taken pursuant to R2P must be sanctioned by them, through the auspices of the UNSC. Central to this unity is the largely shared belief that in granting or withholding their approval for a Council mandate, the P5's global management responsibilities necessitate unfettered room to manoeuvre. Consequently, only France has been willing to actively support the notion that the right to veto R2P-related resolutions should be restricted, although the UK has, somewhat equivocally, suggested that it would support such a proposal if all other P5 states were to do so, a proposition so unlikely as to be effectively meaningless. None of this is to deny that questions over coercive intervention for humanitarian purposes have often divided the Council's permanent members, but whilst the P5 may criticise one another's positions and the exercise of the veto pursuant to these in specific instances -as the P3 have so vehemently done in relations to the P2's vetoes over Syria -for the most part they stand in equally strident opposition to attempts to deny or restrict their veto right in relation to the R2P more generally.
In this alternative account normative and material issues are significant, but they play out very differently compared to the more familiar narratives outlined earlier. In the account offered here power and the manner in which it is distributed between states unite rather than divide the P5, for in significant part it is from material abundance that their special status in the UN system arises. Similarly, normative considerations serve to bond rather than dissect, as the P5 recognise that they are collectively and uniquely required to shoulder special responsibilities under the UN system. In this context the UN's adoption of the R2P can be seen as an extension to the P5's special responsibilities, burdening the Council (and hence most significantly the P5) with a responsibility to protect populations from mass atrocity crimes when their host state has proved unwilling or unable to do so.
Viewed in isolation such a challenge would be daunting enough, since addressing humanitarian crises is a notoriously testing business. But the R2P cannot be so viewed since it arises in addition to the Council's original obligation to preserve international peace and security. Consequently, the R2P not only extends the obligations which befall the P5, it also complicates them since action taken pursuant to the R2P, at least to the extent that it may have to be coercive in nature, may well have negative implications for global order. One of the fundamental challenges posed by the R2P, therefore, is that it places the P5 under a special dual responsibility, with the component elements of this duality, at least potentially, in tension. It is in recognition of this that the UNSC's permanent members have found a basis for R2P-related consensus, reflecting the fact that acting pursuant to this responsibility may give rise not only to clashes of national interest, but also to genuine discord over how best to serve the social obligations to which it gives rise. This article explores the conundrum posed by the P5's special dual responsibility. It begins by examining the relationship between power and intervention, before then exploring the idea that the P5 are, if to some extent reluctantly, increasingly assuming a special responsibility to respond in the face of the mass atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The article then considers the nature of this new, R2P-rooted responsibility and its relationship to the P5's more long-lived special responsibility for preserving international peace and security. It briefly examines the steps taken at the 2005 World Summit to ensure that once the international community's R2P is invoked, this is operationalised exclusively through the discretionary workings of the UNSC, before providing a more extensive discussion of the on-going debate over the so-called 'responsibility not to veto' (RN2V). 5 Here it shows that P5 attitudes to R2P are shaped as context in which it was asked it was abundantly clear that it would also be perceived as pitting the rights and fears of the weak against the domineering proclivities of the strong.
Consequently, any attempt by international society to resolve the normative conundrum posed by the apparent tensions between sovereignty and intervention in the name of human rights would also have to pay due regard to concerns over the material differentials which characterise its diverse membership and the implications which flow from these.
ICISS, the international commission that was established in response to Annan's challenge and originator of the R2P concept, was acutely aware of this. Indeed, the collectively they suggested a significantly greater disposition on its part to determine that intra-state humanitarian emergencies constituted part of its legitimate remit.
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One possible explanation for this pattern of post-1945, pre-R2P practice lies in a material account of international politics, whereby fluctuations in the distribution of power permit or preclude interventions by states inclined to act for humanitarian purposes.
Accordingly, it can plausibly be argued that when the global distribution of power was precariously and antagonistically balanced between those who might otherwise favour intervention and those implacably opposed to it, inaction was the inevitable, materially induced outcome. As Clark and Reus-Smit comment of such times, 'gridlock in the Security Council was ... mirrored in the wider military checks and balances operating beyond its confines.' 18 Moreover, equilibrium combined with Great Power animosity served to stifle pro-interventionary proclivities, not just because of the disorder which might result should a state choose to act, but also because it demoted humanitarian concerns within the hierarchy of interests and priorities which determine state action. 19 Conversely, once power was preponderantly stacked in favour of the would-be interveners, such material constraints were massively loosened, and within the contemplatory space opened up by the absence of any existential threat, those so inclined were able to direct their minds towards matters of erstwhile secondary concern. Consequently, intervention became more common. In an unbalanced Security Council dominated by those of a pro-interventionary bent legitimising endorsement could, moreover, be more easily secured, with alternative the primary responsibility to protect populations from mass atrocity crimes, and secondly, that whilst this responsibility to protect falls initially on a population's home state, where this is not fulfilled, the international community has a residual responsibility to protect the endangered. 22 R2P's life to date has not been untroubled; its conception, gestation, birth and infancy were overshadowed by the conflict in Iraq, 23 and more recently its adolescence has been troubled by the manner in which NATO interpreted and implemented its UNSC mandate to intervene in Libya. 24 Yet despite such issues the advent of the R2P highlights the need to consider an account of interventionary practices which measures more appropriately the balance between material and normative factors. Nowhere is this more necessary than in relation to the actions of the UNSC and its five permanent members, since prior to the R2P's adoption those who questioned the appropriateness of intervention could, at least on the interpretation they favoured, call on the Charter as a basis for their stance.
Intervention, the UN Charter and the R2P
Under Article 24 of the UN Charter the UNSC has 'primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security' and, by implication of the privileges which they enjoy within the Council, its five permanent members can be identified as having a those who harboured concerns over such activities, though subdued by the silencing effects of material inferiority, sought to hedge against the setting of precedents through the insistence that acts of intervention were legitimised only by the 'unique', 'exceptional' and 'extraordinary' nature of the cases concerned. 32 The normative and empirical contorting into which both sides in the debate entered during this period tells us much about the significance which states attach to the normative frameworks within which they operate.
Indeed, with the mind-focusing prospect of mutually assured destruction seemingly consigned to the history books, normative contestation over the appropriate balance to be struck between state and human rights appeared to assume paramouncy in debates over the appropriateness of intervention.
Viewed in this light the significance of the UN's endorsement of R2P is clear. To fully appreciate the nature of the dilemma with which the P5 is now faced we need to go back to the UN's founding. The origins of the United Nations lay in the notion that Great Powers should shoulder the primary burden for directing global affairs and, above all, for preserving international peace and security. 37 The material might of these states -or at least of the so called 'Big Three', the USA, USSR and Great Britain -had proved crucial to victory in the Second World War, and from this it could easily be concluded that it would be essential to the preserving of the post-war peace. To ensure the availability of such power -and hence to rectify one of the most destructive deficiencies of the UN's predecessor the League of Nations -Great Power participation would be secured through the granting of special privileges to these powers, a quid pro quo for the special responsibility for preserving international order which they were expected to assume. Most notable amongst these was their permanent, veto-bearing membership of the UNSC, 38 intended to promote the maintenance of Great Power unanimity and thus to ensure that any resolution which passed successfully through the Council would have the P5's collective backing along with the material support which coincided with this and which was deemed necessary for success. 39 Yet for the states which gathered in 1945 at the UN Conference on International Organization (UNCIO) at which the Charter was approved, 40 the veto was also intended to serve a wider purpose, namely to prevent the UN emerging as a cause of Great It is now a matter of historical record that Great Power cooperation did not survive into the post-war era, and whilst -for the most part courtesy of the logic of mutually this regard they have formed the most potent opposition to the ICISS's other major proposal regarding the UNSC and R2P, namely that:
The Permanent Five members of the Security Council should agree not to apply their veto power, in matters were their vital state interests are not involved, to obstruct the passage of resolutions authorizing military intervention for human protection purposes for which there is otherwise majority support.
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This proposal was based on what was originally a French suggestion, 54 and whilst France briefly returned to the P5 fold in opposing veto restraint, it was later to resume its position as a Great Power outlier on the matter. Like the other ICISS proposals referred to above, the idea of a so-called RN2V failed to gain support at the 2005 World Summit, but the proposal is nevertheless of relevance to the arguments proffered here for three reasons:
firstly, because the debate over such a responsibility is ongoing; secondly, because in their rejection of this claim the P4 states have referred explicitly to the logic of 1945, the special responsibilities with which they were then charged, and the associated privileges which they were granted; and finally, because the notion of a RN2V puts into stark relief the potential tensions which may arise as the P5 attempt to live up to their special dual responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and the prevention of mass atrocity crimes.
In proposal', 58 and as support duly ebbed away the S5 withdrew their draft resolution.
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The episode was, in Lehman's words 'first and foremost a show of force on the part of a P5 determined to maintain their control over the representation of member states'
interests and the reform agenda at the UN', 60 but even this did not mark the end of the road for the RN2V. Great Power opposition to the proposal was by now running against the tide of growing support amongst UN members 61 and wider civil society movements engaged in the debate. 62 This increasing prominence and significance of the RN2V proposal owed much to the UNSC's failure to address the conflict in Syria, but for many this case not only vindicated arguments in favour of veto-restraint, it also illuminated a perceived incongruity in the behaviour of certain P5 states. This sentiment was best captured by the Singaporean delegate's address to the UNSC in the aftermath of the S5's 2012 attempt to gain UNGA approval for the RN2V, when he recalled how the proposal:
[H]ad asked the P5 to consider refraining from vetoing action aimed at preventing genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. That aspect was considered particularly controversial by the P5, which were affronted by the suggestion that limits be placed on the use of their veto power. That position was shared by all the P-5, even those who fervently support the principle of responsibility to protect. Those permanent members that repeatedly express outrage at what is happening within the Council on issues like Syria are the same ones that blocked [the S5 proposal]. Trumpeting moral outrage over the Council's non-action is particularly hypocritical because whatever divisions there may be among the P-5, they are united in having no limits placed on their use or abuse of the veto.
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Developments in the Middle East led to the splintering of P5 unity over RN2V in 2013
when France reverted to its original policy in favour of veto restraint, but whilst Foreign
Minister Laurent Fabius argued that the 'dramatic human consequences' of UNSC stalemate over Syria 'cannot be accepted by the global conscience', 64 the P4 maintained their opposition. In this context it could plausibly be argued that, however widespread demands for the adoption of RN2V become, they will amount to nought given the material and constitutional brakes which lie in the hands of the P4. 65 Moreover, it is also arguable that, even if the RN2V did secure UNSC assent, it would in practice have little impact, given the caveats which attach to all of its various iterations, namely that it excludes situations in which vital state interests are deemed to be at stake and only becomes operative once a threshold of human suffering set out in the R2P has been crossed. Given the highly Whatever judgements one comes to over the prospects for and desirability of the RN2V, 66 the reasoning behind P4 resistance to it warrants consideration, although such a task is hindered by the fact that little of the P4's opposition has been aired in public forums.
In the Council the S5 and subsequently ACT have succeeded in raising the idea of a RN2V during discussions over UNSC working methods, 67 but the fact that the working method's agenda makes no reference to the topic 68 concerns. 70 This event was used by the US and UK as a forum for criticising Russian and Chinese vetoes over Syria, but whilst the US ambassador chose not to widen her focus and comment on broader based concerns over the notion of a RN2V, the UK was less reticent. Assuring those present that it could not envisage circumstances in which it would use the veto to an important contribution to the debate' but stressed that 'in order to achieve the objective 82 Such discord lies at the very heart of the tension over the P5's special dual responsibility, dividing the Council's permanent members along the P3-P2 axis. Yet simultaneously it unites the Great Powers in recognition of the fact that, so long as such genuinely divergent views prevail, the collective interests of international society are best served by allowing the P5 to prevent the passage of decisions to which they have the most fundamental objections. It would be naive to deny that at times these are manifestations of more narrowly defined national interests, but it would be equally imprudent to refute the idea that they may also stem from the fundamentally different interpretations of the social obligations which P5 states hold.
Conclusion
Decisions over whether to undertake coercive military intervention for humanitarian purposes and the manner in which other states reacted to these are both symptomatic of the prevailing distribution of power and of the outcome of deliberations over the appropriate balancing of state and human rights. It is, therefore, necessary for us to consider these issues and to recognise that the manner in which they amalgamate may, actions on the distribution of power were at their most acute, whereas in today's comparatively benign Great Power environment it is on the nature of sovereignty and the responsibility of states to their citizens and the citizens of other states that attention is centred.
What unites accounts focused on the balance of power and those concerned with the balancing of state and individual rights is that they tend to portray the P5 as divided.
But to understand interventionary behaviour and, in the contemporary context, debates over R2P we must also look beyond these accounts to an alternative which helps explain another key issue, namely the extent to which, despite their divisions, the P5 at times offer a far more united front, as they have most notably in relation to the highly contentious subject of the RN2V. Viewed from this perspective the distribution of power is significant not only as a basis for Great Power competition (though such competition does ensue), but also as a factor which unites the P5 in their shared preponderance of power compared to other states, whilst normative concerns serve not to divide the Great Powers but to unite them in contemplation of the dual responsibility which they, as P5 states, much shoulder above all others. This sense of unity, as opposed to division, is too rarely reflected in the R2P-related discourse and, to the extent that it is (as, for example, with respect to RN2V), the tendency is to depict it as the special pleadings of a privileged, self-serving elite.
But what such criticism of the P5 fails to acknowledge is the extent to which the Council's permanent members are, by virtue of their special dual responsibility, faced with an acute normative tension as they attempt to satisfy the sometimes contradictory demands which stem from their obligations as guardians of international order and as protectors of the victims of mass atrocity crimes. This tension may, of course, at times be cited as a disingenuous cover for ulterior political motives, and viewed from beyond the confines of the P5 and their special dual responsibility, the all too manifest levels of human suffering which crises may entail, especially when compared to the unrealised, perhaps distant, and intangible prospects and implications of wider conflict, focuses attention on such malfeasance. But this does not negate the facts that the tension remains an all too real aspect of global affairs and that the P5 above all others must try to attend to it. Their special dual responsibility demands a high degree of prescience from the P5 and the unpalatable truth of this for them is that policies predicated on a genuine sense of responsibility may be seen as being more akin to a dereliction of humanitarian duty. Amidst harrowing reports of gross human suffering the temptation to rush to judge is strong, but
given the imponderable nature of the P5's special dual responsibility we should resist it.
Such resistance will be assisted if, along with the narratives with which we are more familiar, we also acknowledge the tension inherent in the special dual responsibility of the UNSC's five permanent members.
